Cameron Slater: taking water on board much?

I received the following link and comments from a correspondent last Friday night so decided to read the Judgement included in the link.

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11515312

 

The ruling against whaleoil for defamation. It holds him responsible for comments posted on his blog, and also says that removal of those comments rectifies the problem. AND it hold him responsible for things his wife said – he told his wife about a confidential judicial hearing, and she posted the details on whaleoil. The judge says that even though not an employee, she was an ‘agent’ of his.

 

It was worth the read but I should first say that Cameron is an amusing guy. Somewhere along the line I read that he had been a 'debt collector', collecting debts of gangs. Well, that's funny enough. But I thought it was a little on the nose when a friend said 'What gang? The boy scouts.' I guess old Pam/Cam is a little short off the mark, and everywhere else for that matter apart from his rather gigantic girth. Although everyone is their own size whether they wear high heels or not, Pam didn't assist by being a cry baby on TV some years ago when he wanted people to feel sorry for him because really he was  a good Cam. Anyway some such things passed through my mind when taking the opportunity to read where dear Cam was these days, having finally climbed off the canvas after his recent 30 second boxing bout in which he demonstrated how to fly backwards, forwards, hover, then crash. Way to go Cam/Pam.

 

Off course I knew that Cam had told the World that he was financially backed in his stoush with Colin Craig the Conservative Party Leader who is a full 6 inches taller than Cam/Pam so I was surprised to read Justice Raynor, when handing down a sentence to bad Cam, that he possibly  considered that bad Cam was not only of modest height, but also modest means so he'd lay off the fine. Fair enough, just because Cam doesn't know if he's rich one minute or poor the next isn't a crime. Either apparently is bad Cam breaking a Court Order and confidential conference by telling his wife the details after which she just happened to publish them on bad Cam's blog near enough to straight away. Because Raynor appears to have considered that Cam/Pam told his wife of the confidential details but 'never thought' not to tell her to publish them on his blog when he flew off to Germany.

 

These things happen, people are rich one minute and poor the next - the cost of holidays to Germany set aside. I'm sure also that people have confidential conversations then publish them on public blogs as information that just happens to be in breach of a Court Order when one party flies off to Germany. Interesting in the Judgement which relates to a slow winding defamation suit against Cam there is mention in the Judge's findings as to defamatory statements. Considering that it appears that even before the Trial it is recorded in the Court file that statements published by Cam about the applicant are indeed defamatory from the point of view of at least one Judge. That doesn't look good, nor do 7 convictions just entered against Cam for Contempt of Court over the same matter.

For all the apparent support Cam claims at times it was surprise that he was self represented which might be the result of his modest means as Justice Raynor described. A lot of Court time is being wasted along with the probability of any costs or order for payments not being able to be met. I'm sure if Cam took some structured legal advice he would make the effort to settle this dispute without further delay and get on with life. The same goes for other proceedings issued against him that look to have him entangled up to chin level to the point he may soon be unable to breath.

As the undisputed most read blogger in NZ, and taking into account changes in internet Law and other common law developments under the Harassment Act it would be great if Cam used his popularity and came out the other side of the tunnel he's found himself buried in, publically apologise, construction settlements solutions and no longer be a sad Cam.

Bain compensation: what the calculator says.

With the  Bain application for compensation due for a result before xmas along with a sudden quietness in place since an agreement that settled David Bain's Judicial Review of the former Minister of Justice's decision to not honour an independent review of David's guilt or innocence it could be time to consider how much compensation, if any, he could be awarded. The following, using an inflation calculator, takes as it base line the compensation paid to Arthur Thomas in 1979 after he was pardoned for a double homicide which has never been solved.

Arthur Allen Thomas got $950,000

Go to http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/inflation_calculator/

Set the cost to $950,000, the date of cost to Q4 1979, leave the date for comparison as it is…

Then try putting in $300,000 – which was his inheritance – and seeing what that works out to. 

 I got the following under the general index on the comparison of the amount awarded to Thomas at $4.7 million and $1.6 million for the inheritance he lost under the housing index.

As expected none of the 'hangbainers' were able to respond to my earlier blog 'If the sock print fits,' wherein a picture shows the difference between the shape of David's foot to that of his late father as lifted from the murder scene - it wasn't just size but also shape. Similarly the forensic evidence included in David's application cannot be overcome either individually or collectively - science leads where Justice has stumbled.

Rightly or wrongly, I've been confident about David Bain gaining compensation since he was acquitted at his retrial all those years ago. Perhaps above I don't have my calculations quite right, nevertheless - I'm sure I have one thing correct, that is the credibility of the NZ Justice system is at stake and it will put this actual Miscarriage of Justice right. I sometimes think of the white gloves the killer of the Bain family was said to have worn to see the symbolism of a broken man believing he was putting things right before surrendering his beliefs to his god with a dark shadow and blood over himself that the gloves didn't hide.

Overcoming wrongful imprisonment using the Law as it is.

One of the debates that surround cases such as that of David Bain, Teina Pora, Scott Watson is that we need an independent review procedure similar to that which reviews convictions in Britain. I agree with that, however it is like moving a mountain. I think the way to more easily move the mountain is Judicial Review and more significant funding by way of Legal Aid for cases, at least at the outset, of high public concern that a conviction might be unsound.

Scott Watson fits into that category, his recent application for an Exercise of the Prerogative of Mercy is a diabolical black mark against Executive power forming a remedy for the wrongfully convicted. In the first instance the Watson application took an extended period of time, so much so that in the normal course of events if he were a defendant in a Trial the charges could have been dismissed for want of timely prosecution. Then reading the report into the Watson application, including the manner in which it was looked into, arguably shows that it was not viewed in any merciful way whatsoever. Moreover, common practices of Law, such as individual evidence looked at singularly but also collectively was ignored as has been pointed out in other posts and comments regarding Scott Watson on this blog.

So what does Watson, or others in his situation do? I think there is a clear answer. Take rogue decisions or long delays in recommendations to the Court by way of Judicial Review. I think the old saying of Justice delayed is Justice denied needs to be read with the Bill of Rights. It is a fundamental right that a person know the case against them, that charges or any trial be brought in a timely fashion. When a trial is apparently splintered as in the case of Watson time is of the essence to have it adjudicated by the Courts. The Courts are the home of Justice, not a Government Executive administering 'Mercy' by way of long delays, along with what looks like deliberate lacking of careful Judicial oversight.

I've use this quote by Lord Diplock of the Privy Council before: In de Freitas v Benny [1976] (Court of Appeal in Trinidad), Lord Diplock observed that “mercy is not the subject of legal rights [but] begins where legal rights end.”

Equally interesting are the comments by M Travis below:
 

1.      Some material from M. Travis, May 1998 on the RPOM in NZ.

The whole thing is worth reading, however in the excerpt below is what seems to the answer in Pora – no limits apparent on ‘the discretion’ to exercise. And in the final sentence, what now appears to be a ‘prophetic’ observation regarding a current Judicial Review as, hopefully the Courts and The Executive will ensure that ‘Executive Powers’ are consistent with Statute, due process and Natural Justice – all things which must have been included in the original concepts of the Royal Prerogative. Great observation by Lord Diplock included.

‘The prerogative of mercy seems limited only by the discretion of those who have the power to exercise it – the Sovereign, and the Governor-General by way of delegation in the Letters Patent 1983. Fortunately a precedence has been set by the practice of successive Home Secretaries that, in the words of Ivan Hare , “a free pardon should only be granted in cases where it was established that the convicted individual was both technically and morally innocent.” Although only a precedent and in no way binding, this is most compelling and surely to be followed by successive Governor-Generals.

The only major mechanism that has been suggested for controlling the use of this prerogative is the possible threat of judicial review. So far there has not been a successful appeal for review, but there are many arguments on either side of the issue.

In de Freitas v Benny [1976] (Court of Appeal in Trinidad), Lord Diplock observed that “mercy is not the subject of legal rights [but] begins where legal rights end.” Christopher Gelber considered this a ruling that “the exercise of the prerogative of mercy was inherently extra-legal in nature and therefore not justiciable,” as did Lord Roskill in the G.C.H.Q. case [1985] A.C. 374. Furthermore it cannot be denied that the Crown’s ability to pardon displays the necessary characteristics of a true prerogative; yet there are those like Watkins L.J. who reject the test of justiciability “in favour of an examination of the court’s capacity to weigh the competing issues of principle in each case.” Watkins considered the courts to be competent enough to review the prerogative of mercy.

Nonetheless, a judicial review of the prerogative has never been undertaken in a New Zealand court. The closest thing so far was the ‘review via invitation’ in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Benley [1993] 2 W.L.R. 101; where the Divisional Court did not order a formal review but “[invited] the Home Secretary to look at the matter again.” Ivan Hare saw this invitation as attempting to “impose narrower parameters on the discretion of the Home Secretary” via the informal mechanism of invitation, but he seems dubious as to its ability in having any real effect. This is because it is beyond the role of the courts to suggest a particular result, and because any purported limitation on the role of the Home Secretary is illegitimate.

The issue is also a live one in Burt v Governor-General [1989] 3 NZLR 64, (1987-89) 7 NZAR and [1992] 3 NZLR 672, and some very important contributions to the argument are made. In these cases, Mr Burt sought a judicial review of the Governor-General’s refusal to exercise the prerogative of mercy in granting him a free pardon. Although unsuccessful, Cooke P said that:

“It would be inconsistent with the contemporary approach to say that, merely because [the prerogative of mercy] is a pure and strict prerogative power, its exercise or non-exercise must be immune from curial challenge.”

He states that the Courts’ wish to review the refusal to exercise the prerogative is not “absurd, extreme or contrary to principle” as it is at the very least attempting to ensure that fair procedure has been followed. Moreso he adds that the prerogative of mercy is not “an arbitary monarchical right” but “an integral element in the criminal justice system…a constitutional safeguard against mistakes.”

In conclusion, the prerogative is not to be touched by the Courts or judicial review, yet the concept is one that is winning favour amongst the Judges. It is possible that in a few years there will be mechanisms like judicial review to control the use of the prerogative, but it is very unlikely that it should ever become part of a statute.’

Of course David Bain was the first from memory to succeed with a Judicial Review, at least to the point, of the Minister of Justice agreeing with Bain's counsel to accept a new application from Bain for compensation for wrongful imprisonment. This was after a former Minister of Justice, Judith Collins, displayed a less than merciful grasp of even due process as she set out to apparently take a position opposing an independent finding favouring David Bain's innocence, and his 'right' to compensation. M Travis was quite prophetic in 1998 in his suggestion that in a few years from that time that there will likely be judicial review to control the use of the prerogative. Well, it happened in Bain, possibly years later in my opinion than it should have, but happened nevertheless. There seems to be no known reason that Watson should not take this course, Peter Ellis or Alan Hall, apart from lack of funding. But even that may be contestable on review. For example if a case is made out that is strong enough to support review for Watson or others but funding is denied that decision to deny funding should/is be reviewable.

These approaches can be taken now, with public participation by way of open Court rather than closed Executive Council meetings.

Jay Kuten: In the Whaganui Chronicle on compensatiof for wrongful conviction

Wanganui Chronicle - Jay Kuten: Consider compensation for wrongful convictions

http://www.nzherald.co.nz/wanganui-chronicle/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=1503423&objectid=11510172

By Jay Kuten

9:58 AM Wednesday Sep 9, 2015 

LAST week, a North Carolina State Commission awarded $750,000 each as compensation to two half-brothers, Henry Lee McCollum, 51, and Leon Brown, 47, who spent three decades in prison - much of it on death row.

Both men are developmentally disabled, their IQs in the low 50s. The pair - aged 19 and 15 at the time - were convicted solely on the basis of coerced confessions they later recanted, according to the judge who freed them after DNA testing, long-resisted by authorities, proved them not guilty. After hiring a lawyer who argued that "government and law enforcement officials of Robeson County, NC, had obtained their convictions through 'fraud, perjury, coercion, the wilful failure or refusal to investigate exculpatory evidence'", the two men were awarded $750,000 each.

You may think that a generous amount, but it is less than $15,000 per year in prison. After contingent attorney's fees, each will have $500,000. Considering their lack of job skills - never mind the added burden of prison on mental deficiency - they will be lucky to retain the full amount and have roughly $25,000 a year for the expected lifespan of African-Americans like them.

Does any of that sound remotely familiar? A pattern of over-aggressive and ethically challengeable prosecutorial and/or police misconduct led to a wrongful conviction in which a person lost decades of his life and experienced the severe trauma of imprisonment for an act he did not commit.

Here in New Zealand you can fill in the names of Teina Pora, or David Bain or Peter Ellis - and, I submit, Scott Watson.

These cases raise many questions. How is it that prosecutorial misconduct is rarely if ever called to account in any legally significant manner? And, for the wrongfully convicted, how can we fairly compensate someone whose life has been so severely damaged?

How much is time in prison worth, considering not only the issue of endurance (the day-to-day limitation and degradation of prison life) but the fact of injustice?

In the David Bain case, we have seen the effort by former Minister Judith Collins to safeguard our common treasury by enacting a standard for compensation that is beyond possibility. Collins demanded that Bain prove he is innocent. While that sounds plausible, it is actually impossible. When you enter a courtroom as a defendant you are granted a presumption of innocence. It is a presumption often honoured in the breach. If the evidence against you does not warrant conviction, you are declared not guilty. That is it.

You are never declared innocent and that is in concert with the legal reality and the social one in which your neighbours are unlikely to hold you in the same esteem as before your trial.

Collins, however, insisted that Bain establish for her benefit a new reality - something that was once a presumption but which can never be demonstrated as fact.

Prison time is not subject to quantification. The rare human being - Nelson Mandela - retains his dignity and even grows in stature. Most people are reduced, if only because of the cognitive assault on their functioning.

For our human brains to function optimally, they need, in adult life, the continuing practice of making informed decisions and the challenge of coping with expectable social relationships. That disappears in the authoritarian hierarchy that is prison.

Then there's the Rip van Winkle effect - disorganisation coming out of prison to a new and frightening world. It is in our name that people have been wrongfully convicted and deprived of their fundamental freedom, their presumption of innocence.

One fair standard for compensation would consider that the worth of a year's incarceration be equivalent to the compensation of our own highest representatives in government. In other words, the amount the not guilty might have earned had they been Members of Parliament during the same time period. While our parliamentarians cannot claim innocence except as presumption, the stress of their work is hardly comparable to that of being an inmate, especially one wrongfully convicted.

Jay Kuten is an American-trained forensic psychiatrist who emigrated to New Zealand for the fly fishing. He spent 40 years comforting the afflicted and intends to spend the rest afflicting the comfortable.

Garth McVicar attempts another takeover.

In what may be a NZ first Garth McVicar of the Sensible Sentencing Trust this week took the National Parole Board to Court. This was an attempt to overturn a decision by the Parole Board to release a convicted fraudster Rob Petricevic on Parole on Monday the 7th of September. I read about the Court action Friday afternoon and learnt that the application was for a Judicial Review of the Parole Boards (PB's) decision. That late in the day I wondered how Garth McVicar could convince the Court that he could be a party of standing in the Board's decision, or if the Act, allowed situations where a party could essentially invite themselves into an action that for all intents and purposes wasn't their direct business or something which directly affected them. I certainly couldn't recall any such legislation but it seemed unlikely that McV would take such steps if he didn't have status. A quick read showed that the Act in fact did not allow such applications but that in practice the Courts would likely 'hear' the arguments before ruling on them.

What I hadn't realised was that by the time I'd read about the application was that it had already taken place. In fact shortly after the online decision was released a little after 5 in the evening - indicating that the presiding Judge most likely saw the application as pressing. The Judgement is available on line and is most notable by what was said regarding  McV's application. The application appears to have been made on the basis that 2 or 3 (apparently unnamed) victims of the frauds of Petrievic may have been members of the Trust. Nothing definite on that, a surprise because a victim coming forward would have status at the very least above a political lobby group.

As it happens a wag on line said that the action was doomed to failure and was actually an effort by McV to take on the Parole Board. That might have been unkind but McVicar in recent years has attempted to take control of Judges by threatening to start a register against those of whose decisions he did not approve. There was even talk of 'outing' Judges and protesting at their homes in what was a fairly frightening turn in a modern society and which must have been near to resulting in charges being brought against McV and the SST. McV had actually threatened the Judiciary, telling them to give decisions of which he approved or watch out. All in all the fact that he was taking the case for Judicial Review in a legal way could have been either that he was chastised to the view that the Law was paramount or that he had convinced himself, or been convinced that he must take on the Courts head on - and that a Judicial Review of a Parole Board decision was a way to do that.

In other words McV was worried less about Petricevic than the opportunity to  take on the Courts and flex his muscles and political power? If it was that later then choosing an attempt at a remedy that was bound to fail made little sense, nevertheless it did look like round 2 of McV versus the Law. Increasingly what his argument would be was fascinating. From sound bites it soon became clear that McVicar's 'lead' counsel against the convicted fraudster was another convicted fraudster and practicing Lawyer David Garrett who at the very least was straight to the point. He argued that the Parole Board's duty and directives were to let those eligible for parole go at the first opportunity a view overlooking many Legislative requirements. This despite that the NZ Parole system is tighter than it has even been historically, and that Petricevic had been denied parole at least once earlier and only gained parole when he had been frank and honest about his offending (having earlier downplayed it, or suggested that it was the fault of others.)

So how did this go? Well apart from not having one victim in sight to support their case, Garratt argued that fraudsters were as bad or worse than those that robbed dairies. I've no idea the relevance of that, or how a Judge could decide a case on the basis of who were the worst criminals in a clearly defined application to have Petricevic kept in prison on the basis that he 'might' have been worse that a dairy robber. The submissions included the harm fraudsters did to the elderly in particular, while these were comments with merit they were beyond the scope of a Judicial Review. Petricevic had already been sentenced for his crime, served several years and the argument was as to whether or not he should be released, and whether or not McVicar had any legitimate role in that. It appears that Garratt on McVicar's behalf paid no consideration to the telling fact that the PB had earlier rejected Parole for Petricevic on the basis that he had no insight into his offending, was self important and so on - in short did their job.

The fact that Petricevic had been able to pay for an independent psychological report from which experience Petricevic claimed to have a better understanding of himself and the harm to the victims was seen as his having 'brought' a favourable view. There is no proof of that, it is unfortunate that a professional person having formed an opinion, after which the subject of the opinion, made frank disclosures which help him gain parole - was subject to such assertions.

But back to the real reason for the Judicial Review, McVicar's chance to take on the Justice system, Judges in particular along with the Parole Board. Did he not consider that first of all he would have needed status, and that secondly a general discussion as to who the worse criminals might be wasn't relevant in an application about 1 individual's parole? Nothing to show that he did. If he missed the bus on that he also missed the bus on another argument, possibly less irrelevant. At the outset in public statements McV said the well educated (as Petricevic is apparently) were also worse because they came from privileged backgrounds but still chose to offend, whereas, it was implied, those worse off may have had less choice or power or reason in any decision to offend. Good point, and another good point (but also typically irrelevant as well to the Judge had it been made) was that those inmates who couldn't afford a private report as Petricevic was able, who had no home to go to and so on were disadvantaged compared to Petricevic. Though I guess the application was not about the fairness of Parole Board applications or distinction between the rich or poor but about Garth laying down the Law as he saw it from Garthsville, Arizona.

My last tongue in cheek comment aside, McVicar, most probably inadvertently - by his failed action did advance case Law on an important aspect of Judicial Review and the Bill of Rights. Most likely, he may not realise it, but the importance of opportunity and fairness before the Law were canvassed in the Judicial Review, at least for those that can see that.